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Abstract
Background: We report our experience in the hospital management of mass casualty following the Jos civil crisis of 2001.
Materials and Methods: A retrospective analysis of the records of patients managed in the Jos civil crisis of September 
2001, in Plateau State, Nigeria. Information extracted included demographic data of patients, mechanisms of injury, 
nature and site of injury, treatment modalities and outcome of care.
Results: A total of 463 crisis victims presented over a 5 day period. Out of these, the records of 389 (84.0%) were 
available and analyzed. There were 348 (89.5%) males and 41 females (10.5%) aged between 3 weeks and 70 years, 
with a median age of 26 years. Most common mechanisms of injury were gunshot in 176 patients (45.2%) and blunt 
injuries from clubs and sticks in 140 patients (36.0%). Debridement with or without suturing was the most common surgical 
procedure, performed in 128 patients (33%) followed by exploratory laparotomy in 27 (6.9%) patients. Complications 
were documented in 55 patients (14.1%) and there were 16 hospital deaths (4.1% mortality). Challenges included 
exhaustion of supplies, poor communication and security threats both within the hospital and outside.
Conclusion: Most patients reaching the hospital alive had injuries that did not require lifesaving interventions. Institutional 
preparedness plan would enable the hospital to have an organized approach to care, with better chances of success. 
More effective means of containing crises should be employed to reduce the attendant casualty rate.
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Introduction
The complex nature of natural and man‑made disasters poses 
multidisciplinary challenges of effective management of any 
local emergency medical services.[1] Disaster and mass casualty 
are often used interchangeably and refers to a situation where 
a large number of injured patients present simultaneously 
to an Accident and Emergency (A and E) unit of a hospital 
overwhelming its material and human resources. The idea of 
mass casualty management incorporates a single chain of events 
that involves field triage and resuscitation, transportation, 
hospital triage, immediate and continued management.
A laid down protocol based on the principle of advance 
planning and disaster preparedness is a necessity to 
ensure a coordinated and optimal use of personnel and 
scarce resources. Earlier reports[2,3] from our center have 
shown how the use of a protocol could result in successful 
immediate management of mass casualty.
In summary, the Jos protocol proceeds as follows in our 
institution: once there is simultaneous presentation of more 
patients than our surge capacity of seven, a mass casualty 
situation is declared by the most senior doctor on ground 
in the accident and emergency unit. There is immediate 
mobilization of doctors and nurses from other parts of the 
hospital to the A and E with activation of the cascade callout 
system [Figure 1] to mobilize staff from outside the hospital 
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and notification of the Hospital Management. A triage zone 
is set up and the most senior surgeon on ground carries 
out the hospital emergency room (ER) triage. Casualties 
are assigned triage categories of immediate, delayed, 
expectant or dead/walking wounded. All elective surgeries 
are suspended and two operative teams set up in the twin 
theater. Each is manned by a consultant or Senior Registrar 
supported by the anesthetists and scrub nurses. Patients in 
need of immediate surgery are assigned to either of the two 
teams. Depending on the magnitude of the incident, clinics 
may be stopped, personnel there redeployed to the A and 
E, wards evacuated and patients who can be managed at 
home discharged to make room for the influx of casualties. 
The consultant surgeon on call notifies the Chief Medical 
Director who mobilizes the top management to the hospital. 
The management will then coordinate the mobilization of all 
heads of the department to the hospital as well as coordinate 
with other agencies responding to the crisis such as the 
police, military etc., as may be required. The management 
also notifies the government at the state and national levels 
and coordinates collaboration with other hospitals involved 
in the response. Access to the media and information flow 
out of the hospital is centrally coordinated by the Public 
Relations department in conjunction with the office of the 
Chief Medical Director.
In civilian crises characterized by continuing hostility, the 
sense of insecurity of the attending personnel compounds 
the problem. On the 7th of September 2001, 4 days before the 
twin towers attack in New York on 9/11, a violent civilian 
conflict erupted in Jos engulfing the whole city resulting 
in the collapse of law and order with attendant loss of 
lives and property. It lingered until the 12th of September 
2001. This paper reports our experience with the hospital 
management of the mass casualty from this disaster with 
the aim of highlighting the difficulties encountered and 
improving future health care responses to conflicts in our 
environment and recommending ways of prevention.
Materials and Methods
The Jos University Teaching Hospital (JUTH) is a 520 
bed capacity hospital that provides tertiary care to Plateau 
State and the neighboring, Taraba, Nasarawa, Bauchi and 
Southern parts of Kaduna States in Nigeria. Plateau State 
is located in North Central Nigeria, occupies a landmass 
of about 30,000 km2, occupies a high altitude with a peak 
of about 1,829 m above sea level and has a population of 
about 3.2 million people from the 2006 estimates.
This is a retrospective review of the experience of JUTH 
in the management of the mass casualty from the Jos civil 
crisis of 7‑11th September 2011. Patients were identified 
from the Accident and Emergency disaster records, the 
operating and admission registers and their case notes 
retrieved from the Hospital’s Medical Records Department. 
Information extracted included demographic data of 
patients, mechanism of injury, nature and site of injury, 
treatment modalities and outcome of care.
Hospital response
Following the first surge of the first series of injured 
patients to our center which exceeded our usual capacity 
to cope, a mass casualty situation was declared. The most 
senior surgeon on ground functioned as the mass casualty 
commander and the triage officer. Two operative teams were 
stationed in the operating rooms (OR) made up of surgeons, 
Figure 1: The cascade call out system
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nurses and anesthetists and several smaller teams (made up 
of doctors, nurses, students and co‑opted volunteers) in the 
ER. Following ER triage, patients were assigned to teams 
according to priority. Patients in need of urgent surgical 
operations were triaged to the OR whereas those who 
needed resuscitation or only minor procedures to stabilize 
them were triaged to one of the ER teams.
Initial care followed the advanced trauma life support 
protocol with primary survey and resuscitation followed by 
secondary survey. Laboratory investigations were limited 
to hematocrit and blood grouping and cross‑matching. 
Radiological investigations were kept to a minimum, 
except where they were critical to decision making. 
Definitive treatment depended on the specific injuries 
found on evaluation in the ER or at exploration in the OR. 
Intravenous fluids, blood transfusion, tetanus prophylaxis, 
antibiotics and analgesics were instituted as indicated.
Results
A total of 463 crisis victims (excluding the “dead on arrival” 
cases) were attended to over a 4 day period. Out of this, the 
records of 389 patients (84.0%) were available and analyzed. 
There were 348 males and 41 females (m: f = 8.5:1) 
aged between 3 weeks and 70 years with a median age 
of 26 years [Table 1]. Gunshot was the most common 
mechanism of injury in 176 patients (45.2%), machete/
knife injuries were seen in 140 (36.0%), injuries from clubs 
and blunt instruments 51 (13.1%), impalements by arrows 
in 15 (3.9%) and burns in 10 (2.6%). Three patients had 
injuries inflicted by multiple mechanisms. Table 2 shows the 
distribution of the causes of injury by mechanism.
Table 3 shows the regional distribution of the injuries 
by mechanism. Irrespective of the mechanism of injury, 
head and neck were the most common regions affected, 
in 171 patients (44.0%), closely followed by extremity 
injuries in 168 patients (43.2%). 17 patients (4.4%) were 
poly‑traumatized with a combination of head, neck and 
extremity injury accounting for 10 patients (2.6%), chest 
head and neck injuries in 2 patients (0.5%) and various 
other combinations in 5 other patients (1.3%).
Debridement with or without suturing was the most common 
surgical procedure performed in 128 patients (32.9%), 
exploratory laparotomy was carried out in 27 patients (6.9%), 
manipulation under anesthesia with or without Plaster of 
Paris (POP) casting in 22 patients (5.7%), eye surgery 
in 19 patients (4.9%), tube thoracostomy in 13 patients 
(3.3%), exploratory burr hole in 6 (1.5%) and miscellaneous 
procedures in 38 patients (98%). Some of these included 
fasciotomies, venous cut downs, suprapubic cystostomies, 
local wound explorations, tracheostomies and external 
skeletal fixation. The eye trauma is the subject of a different 
report by the ophthalmology unit of our hospital.[4] Table 4 
shows the surgical procedures that the patients had. 
11 patients (2.8%) received whole blood transfusions 
between 1 and 5 units with a median of 2units.
A total of 55 complications were documented. Wound 
infection accounted for 35 (9.0%), joint stiffness and 
residual paralysis in 8 (2.1%), impaired vision or blindness 
without loss of globe 5 (1.3%) and other complications in 
5 patients (1.3%). Duration of hospitalization ranged from 
1 day to 5 months with a median of 15 days. There were 16 
hospital deaths (4.1% mortality). Out of these, burns related 
Table 1: Age and sex distribution of casualties
Age Sex Total Percentage
Male Female
<10 6 1 7 1.8
11‑20 58 7 65 16.7
21‑30 139 14 153 39.3
31‑40 83 12 95 24.4
41‑50 48 5 53 13.6
51‑60 11 2 13 3.3
61‑70 3 0 3 0.8














Gunshot 46 26 46 85 203
Machete/knife 91 3 15 52 161
Clubs/blunt instruments 25 ‑ 1 18 44
Arrows 6 ‑ ‑ 8 14
Burns 3 1 3 5 7
Total 171 30 65 168 429
NB=Some patients had injury to multiple body regions while some had 
injury by multiple mechanisms





Eye surgery 19 4.9
Tube thoracostomy 13 3.3
Exploratory burr hole 6 1.5
Others 38 9.8
NB=Some patients had multiple procedures, MU/POP = Plaster of paris
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causes accounted for 5, chest injuries, poly‑trauma and 
bowel perforations accounted for 3 (18.8%) each, whereas 
head injuries and tetanus accounted for one each (6.0%).
Discussion
A mass casualty situation is said to exist when there is the 
simultaneous presentation of sufficient numbers of injured 
patients to overwhelm the institutional capacity to cope.[5] 
Of importance to this definition is not only the absolute 
number of casualties, but the rate at which they present. 
Presentation of more numbers than the maximum, which 
the facility can comfortably handle at any given time (surge 
capacity) will imply a fall in the standard of care and qualifies 
as a mass casualty situation irrespective of the absolute 
number.[6] Prior to the 7th of September 2001, on the basis 
of our previous experience with the management of mass 
casualties from vehicular collisions we had established that 
in our institution, the JUTH, our surge capacity was limited 
to seven patients needing lifesaving care at the same time 
and any figure in excess of that constituted a mass casualty 
situation for us.[3] The presentation of 463 injured patients 
to our institution over 5 days (arriving in continuous surges 
at an average of nearly 100/day) well exceeded our capacity 
to cope and constituted a mass casualty situation.[2,3] All the 
same our response was based on our previous experience in 
the management of mass casualty from vehicular collisions, 
with the activation of our Jos protocol and our cascade 
callout system.[7] However, we had to modify several 
aspects of our protocol to meet the challenges occasioned 
by the ongoing nature of thehostility and the disruption 
of organized societal mechanisms for several days which 
characterized the crisis.
In this study, young adult males in their third decade formed 
the majority of the crisis victims and this is consistent with 
the epidemiology of trauma generally.[5] This preponderance 
of young males in our study was because these were the 
rioters in the first place and bore the brunt when the 
security agencies were called in to control the situation. 
Similar reports from Kaduna[8] and Calabar[9] support this 
demographic characteristic of victims of violent civilian 
conflicts in Nigeria.
The Jos crisis of 2001 was characterized by viciousness, 
horrendous attacks and excessive brutality. Although gunshot 
injuries predominated as a mechanism of injury (176, 45.2%), 
the initial weapons of offence were machetes, knives (140, 
36.0%) and blunt instruments (51, 13.1%). Then gunshot 
injuries subsequently appeared and came to predominate as 
the most common mechanism of injury for two reasons. First 
was the fact that the combatants quickly armed themselves 
with firearms to gain the upper hand over their opponents and 
secondly, the military when drafted to control the situation 
used live rounds and caused a considerable number of injuries 
themselves. This accounted for the mixture of both high and 
low velocity type of gunshot injuries, which we encountered. 
These demographics closely parallel the experience from 
Kaduna, following a civil crisis 1 year before ours.[8] Civilian 
gunshot wounds have been shown to be a common problem 
in post‑civil war Nigeria as a result of the escalation of 
inter‑personal, communal violence and civil upheavals and 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons[10,11] and rising 
ethno‑religious hatred, intolerance and violence.
Regional distribution of the injuries indicated that the head 
and neck was the most common topographical area injured 
followed closely by the upper and lower limbs. These are 
injuries inflicted at close range and are quite similar to 
the experience from Kaduna.[8] The reason for this is that 
initial mechanism of injuries involved interpersonal violence 
at close range using sharp and blunt weapons. It is an 
indication of the lethal intent of the blows and the resulting 
defensive injuries hence the preponderance of head, neck 
and upper extremity injuries. Abdominal and chest injuries 
featured less prominently and were often from penetrating 
gunshot injuries. Reports from Benin[12] and Lagos[13] found 
the abdomen to be the most commonly injured body part 
in civilian gunshot injuries.
The most common procedure done was debridement with 
or without closure in 128 patients (32.9%). Fewer patients 
required laparotomies (6.9%), chest tube insertions (3.3%) 
and exploratory burr holes (1.5%). Majority of the patients 
did not require treatment beyond initial resuscitative care. 
This is in keeping with our previous experience and is 
similar to the experience from the crisis in Kaduna.[8] Most 
survivors of disasters generating mass casualties have non 
critical injuries.[14] In the Madrid terrorist bombing of 2004, 
out of 312 patients that presented to one hospital as part 
of the mass casualty, 29 were critically injured and only 
seven required life‑saving emergency surgery.[15] This is 
the experience from several reports in the management of 
mass casualties irrespective of the specific etiology of the 
event. The challenge, therefore, in the management of mass 
casualties is identifying the few severely injured patients 
from the multitude that present following the disaster; 
a situation likened to looking for a needle in a haystack. 
This is the rationale for the necessity of a highly effective 
triage system that will sieve out patients that are critical, 
but salvageable.[16] Triage has to be done both in the field, 
to determine priorities for evacuation and destination and 
in the ER to determine priorities for care. The field triage 
in our experience was rudimentary, but we had in place an 
effective ER triage that identified critical but salvageable 
patients once they arrived in the hospital. Following triage, 
the definitive treatment was fairly straight forward and 
followed the standard care as would have obtained for 
isolated patients presenting under normal circumstances.
Complications were documented in 55 patients. Wound 
infection was the commonest complication encountered. 
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There were also two cases of tetanus one of whom died. 
Such infective complications are not unexpected for 
several reasons: First the wounds were sustained under 
contaminated or dirty circumstances in the field, several 
patients had significant delays before reaching the hospital 
due to disruption in public transportation and impassable 
roads from ongoing hostilities and use of antibiotics was 
erratic in the hospital, once initial supplies became depleted. 
Similar problems were encountered in Kaduna experience 
where some laparotomies were performed without antibiotic 
cover.[8] There were 16 deaths (4.1% mortality). This does 
not however reflect the true magnitude of mortalities from 
the crisis itself. A government panel report on this crisis a 
few years later put the death toll at over 1000.[17] This was 
a similar finding to the Kaduna study where the hospital 
mortality was low, but overall loss of lives was estimated 
to have been quite high. The low hospital mortality may 
be attributable to the possibility that most of the deaths 
occurred in the field where a natural selection process had 
taken place, those presenting to the hospitals in all likelihood 
had less severe degrees of injury and hospital response to 
these injuries was adequate. Most were discharged in less 
than 2 weeks after admission (median duration of stay was 
15 days) while one patient had a compound comminuted 
tibial fracture from high velocity gunshot that required 
complex reconstruction and stayed for 5 months. We found 
the overall outcome of the management of our patients 
acceptable given the limitations we faced. This is mostly due 
to the fact that we had achieved some level of experience 
and preparedness in the management of mass casualties prior 
to this incident, our reference scenario having previously 
been mass casualties from road traffic collisions.
We faced several challenges due to the disruption of 
the normal functioning of society while the crisis lasted. 
Communication was a big challenge as there was no prior 
warning before casualties arrived. Transportation to and 
from the hospital was hazardous for staff, patients and the 
general public. Hospital supplies became depleted and 
could not be restocked and this occurred right from day 1. 
Mobilization of critical staff to the hospital became difficult 
by day 2 due to the ongoing hostility on the streets and 
difficulty with communication. By day 3, feeding became 
problematic and tensions arose among refugees on the 
hospital premises threatening to make the hospital itself 
another theatre in the crisis. This came to a head on day 
4 when the hospital was invaded by hoodlums who were 
repelled by military personnel guarding the hospital. By day 
5, enough order had been restored to the town to permit 
limited movement of personnel and equipment but certain 
neighborhoods remained hostile and impassable.
Whereas there was practically no pre‑hospital care and 
field triage was crude, the military was very helpful in 
evacuation of the casualties to hospital as the roads were 
unsafe for civilians. Cooperation and coordination between 
civilians and the military has been reported to facilitate 
the evacuation of the wounded in such mass casualties as 
occurred in the Bali bombings[18,19] and the war in Sudan.[20] 
We enjoyed no such privilege: The roads were hostile for 
the wounded, their rescuers and all else. Only the military, 
because they were armed, could venture out to rescue and 
evacuate the wounded.
We recommend that all hospitals develop a local disaster 
response protocol. Such a protocol should be based on 
the more frequently observed causes of mass casualty (a 
reference scenario) especially road traffic collisions 
but should make provision for challenges associated 
with unusual etiologies that disrupt organized societal 
mechanisms as occurred in ours. We also recommend 
greater restraint on the part of security personnel involved 
in the response to such crises. We were informed by some 
of our patients that their injuries were inflicted by security 
personnel. Such injuries inflicted by security personnel are 
commonplace in Nigeria in peacetime[9] and its occurrence 
during crisis is not entirely unexpected. In the aftermath of 
the crisis, there were several reports by media organizations 
and human rights groups of gross abuse of human rights and 
extrajudicial killings by security personnel in the crisis.[21] 
We recommend that more effective means of controlling 
rioting crowds should be employed by security agencies 
without increasing the casualty figures from the crisis. 
We opine that teargas, pepper/water spray and plastic 
bullets should be employed first before resorting to live 
ammunition.
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